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Abstract— Anonymous communication systems (ACS) offer 
privacy and anonymity through the Internet. They are mostly free 
tools and are popular among users all over the world. In the recent 
years, anonymity applications faced many problems regarding 
traffic engineering methods. Even though they ensure privacy 
under some conditions, their anonymity will be endangered by 
high performance processing units. To address these issues, this 
study is devoted to investigating traffic-engineering methods in 
anonymous communication systems, and proposes an analytical 
view of the current issues in ACS privacy and anonymity. Our 
study also indicates new types of solutions for these current issues 
with ACS. 
Index Terms—Anonymous Communication Systems, Network 
Security, Traffic Engineering, Anonymity, Privacy.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent years, cyber systems faced new challenges 
regarding user’s privacy. Various communication applications 
have emerged, the number of Internet users is growing rapidly, 
and connecting facilities are increasing respectively. At the 
moment, the number of cyber threats is growing very fast. The 
main problem is caused by inadvertent network users who do not 
follow security rules for their network-related activities. Users 
seek for practical solutions to ensure their network-based 
activities are safe and their private data would not be shared with 
third parties. One of the straightforward solutions to this demand 
is to use anonymous communication systems (ACS). They offer 
free applications but the interference of governmental 
organizations decreases their credibility [1]. ACS is a good 
response to this type of issues but there is one basic question. We 
are sure that they are not fully invulnerable. This paper is an 
attempt to indicate new challenges in security of ACS. 
Anonymous communication systems are used to preserve 
user’s privacy and anonymity. They provide privacy using 
strong cryptography methods [1]. Multi-layered encryption 
made ACS stronger than ordinary encryption and by the way, 
the power of Mix Networking is given to it [2]. So, onion routers 
and special protocols help to provide layered encryption [3]. 
Consider a network structure in which its source only knows 
about the next station. Each station has its own encryption layer. 
After at least three encrypted steps, it is very hard to detect the 
location of the first station. If we name stations as onion routers, 
it will be an ordinary ACS. Tor is the most salient ACS in the 
world which is very popular among Internet users [4]. It provides 
free access using volunteer middle servers. This part of ACS’ 
architecture increases anonymity of the entire user base. 
The main issue regarding anonymous communication 
systems is the possibility of performing traffic engineering in 
such applications. It would be necessary to investigate every 
direction which may undermine privacy and security of the 
users. It is very difficult to address all of the vulnerabilities and 
threats. However, in this paper we aim to indicate the most 
popular approaches that endanger security and privacy of ACS. 
An analytical view is given in two different directions. The first 
is to investigate the possible and current approaches in traffic 
engineering that may have a destructive effect on ACS 
performance and security. The second is related to the new 
solutions and alternatives for current anonymous channels used 
in popular anonymity applications like Tor. Here, we discuss the 
pros and cons of the mentioned approaches via an analytical 
perspective and practical evaluations. 
New approaches are proposed when the users feel uncertain 
about security mechanisms of the system. Security reports and 
social developments escalate this situation. Security engineers 
must have alternative solutions and security enhancements to 
provide users with high immunity and privacy. For example, 
recent reports show that some governmental activities have 
started to reveal Tor’s network traffic [1]. This would not be 
possible without using high performance and distributed 
computing systems. To address this issue, some researchers 
devoted their research work to design novel anonymous 
channels [5]. These new channels change the current order of 
anonymous applications. Some research works have shown 
hidden defects and security issues in anonymous communication 
systems [6]. They help researchers to understand current 
situations and real threats. So, they would design and prepare 
new solutions to cope with such security problems. 
Traffic engineering is a branch in network systems which is 
devoted to analyzing a sequence of network packets [7]. In 
traffic engineering, instance data, consisting of a set of packets, 
is sampled [8]. This data is categorized and compared to pre-
known signatures or a knowledge database. If any match is 
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found, that traffic flow is considered as a security exception for 
a security exception. Otherwise, ordinary transactions are 
continued. In this process, the main goal is to find some patterns 
of network traffic which may cause potential threats.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: current traffic 
engineering approaches are presented in Section II. New 
solutions and alternative systems are illustrated in Section III. 
The analysis, practical results, comparison, and the evaluation 
are investigated in Section IV. Finally, the paper is concluded in 
Section V. 
II. TRAFFIC ENGINEERING APPROACHES IN ACS 
By definitions, Mix networks adopt network routing 
protocols which are more complex than ordinary routing and 
consequently, they are harder to trace via third parties [9]. They 
mostly use several proxies between the sources and their 
destinations. Anonymous communication systems are part of 
applications that evolved from Mix networks.  
A. Strong Cryptography Methods in ACS 
Tor is the most popular ACS which provides a high level 
anonymity and privacy for users throughout the Internet [10]. 
Typically, ACS supports associated applications with two basic 
features including encryption of all transmitted data packets and 
hiding user’s identity. Using strong encryption methods, it 
enhances security and privacy of the user’s network identity and 
ensures users with high level of immunity against common 
attacks. Originally, a series of volunteer middle servers called 
relays, helps to provide mix networks through the connections. 
Each server may encrypt or decrypt its own layer of security and 
overall, they make it hard to reveal the origin of the senders. This 
procedure enables the system to provide anonymity feature to its 
applications. 
As mentioned, Tor is the most popular ACS among Internet 
users. In the recent years, it has been known as the most immune 
anonymous application for private and secure network 
interactions. But there are new issues regarding its privacy-
preserving features and performance that make users concerned 
about their privacy [11]. According to many works, Tor causes 
performance issues when real-time communications matter [12]. 
This issue is tangible because Tor uses a series of middle-servers 
to support onion routing protocols [13]. It includes some proxies, 
encryptions, decryptions, and key exchange protocols. In fact, 
performance issues of Tor effect its security architecture.  
Tor supports full encryption and decryption methods using 
strong cryptographic algorithms. It is not acceptable if someone 
would be able to reach plain data within the Tor network. But 
recent security analysis shows that Tor and similar ACS 
applications may have several vulnerabilities leading to 
information leakage or other types of exploits [14]. As shown in 
Figure 1, its cryptography method is based on at least three 
different layers between sender and receivers. To send data from 
Alice to an ACS node such as an exit node (Dan), we need to 
pass at least the following encryption and relay steps: 
i. Relay CAB AESK1(AESK2(AESK3(Data or commands))) 
ii. Relay CBC AESK2(AESK3(Data or commands)) 
iii. Relay CCD AESK3(Data or commands) 
iv. Decrypt and run Data or commands on last OR 
 
 
Fig. 1. Layered cryptography methods used in popular ACS security 
architectures. 
During the same steps, plain data is encrypted using three 
different keys. Each layer decrypts its related layer and cannot 
not access plain data and its origin. Starting from Dan, the 
following steps are conducted for anwering in order to complete 
the process of anonymous communication. 
i. Relay CCD AESK3(results) 
ii. Relay CBC AESK2(AESK3(results)) 
iii. Relay CAB AESK1(AESK2(AESK3(results))) 
iv. Decrypt and show results on OP 
 
Consider that even with the described strong cryptographic 
methods, there are still some kinds of vulnerabilities which arise 
from traffic engineering methods. In the following section, we 
describe related current issues. 
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B. Traffic Engineering Methods 
Discerning new attacks and common vulnerabilities could 
help to improve security aspects of ACSs before any exploit 
happens. A considerable part of the recent research on ACS is 
devoted to detecting these vulnerabilities. The main tool for 
detecting an anomaly is traffic engineering. Traffic engineering 
is used in both detecting a new threat through the network 
interactions and discerning the behavior of a specific application 
in the network. The first aspect aids the security of the 
anonymous communication system. But the second may 
jeopardize its security infrastructure. A prerequisite for this 
attempt is the ability to discern encrypted data through the 
Internet. One of viable approaches is Hidden Markov Model 
which firstly provided detection of a network flow among an 
encrypted proxy [15]. Most of the network analysis techniques 
are based on the three vital origins: direction, time and packet 
size. Some techniques like the HMM [15] and session 
classification [16] consider time and size features for their traffic 
engineering methods, but some others use the direction of the 
data flow [17] or mixed information of the direction and size or 
time [18].  
Because of their anonymous nature, they should be less 
dependent on directions [19]. Allegedly, an important source of 
security bugs related to user’s privacy is browser fingerprinting 
on the web [20]. It leads to executing some analysis attack on 
anonymous applications [21]. Internet traffic analysis requires 
super-computing units that are placed in the Internet backbone 
[22]. This is the main concern in security of these systems. 
 As long as we can detect the vulnerabilities, we will prevent 
both active and passive attacks such as Sybil attack, timing, 
packet counting, profiling, disclosure, forgery, 
deanonymization, and intersection attacks [23]. Consider that 
most of these attacks are categorized as public vulnerabilities 
which are rampant among all types of network applications. 
Some vulnerabilities are associated to special types of 
application’s architecture and model. For example, when an 
ACS is prepared to work via a peer-to-peer network, it is obvious 
that all types of attacks and vulnerabilities associated with the 
host environment could affect the anonymous application. 
One of our recent investigations in traffic engineering has led 
to detecting unidentified network traffic [24]. In the same work, 
we found out when a new type of network flow has appeared, 
we could detect its nature. However, even though we could not 
fully analyze its danger level because of strong cryptography 
methods, the ability to estimate the type of application behind 
the same traffic still exists. This means that even if we could not 
access plain data of an anonymous communication system like 
Tor, we can understand its type and that it is Tor traffic. This is 
the source of many problems in ACS security. 
The proposed manner to analyze cryptographic data is as 
follows. Firstly, we get a set of sampled data from real network 
traffic. If it is matched to any pre-known samples in the database, 
it is detected. If not, we can set a new record for the same traffic 
and guess its danger level according to the other vulnerabilities. 
When the subject is an anonymous communication system, we 
can perform comparisons to determine a most precise similarity 
level except danger level. To do that, we have to use a random 
process. We chose random walk that uses type theory as its final 
similarity measurement [25]. 
To establish the process of random walk, let Rk be a set of 
random vectors, which are considered to be independent. Rk 
only takes values ±ei, i=1,2,…,d with probability of 1/2d 
where d is the maximum distance. The challenge is to 
monitor the walker’s position after n steps, while performing 
calculation of equation (1) where X represents each step. 
This is called simple random walk and one of its applications 
is to simulate random behaviors in the real world, especially 
in computer networks [26]. 
 
S𝑛 = ∑ X𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
                           (1) 
 
When random walk is used in modeling of the system, we let 
a random walker move along, using several modeling 
parameters. Here, time and size are considered as two basic 
parameters. This gives similarity measurements for several 
input network traffics. If one of them is a set of sequences for 
Tor’s real traffic, we could measure similarity of each input 
sequence with that. The work has a complex method to perform 
the process of sampling, categorizing, estimating, modeling, 
and similarity measuring in the entire system.  
III. NEW SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 
As mentioned before, traffic engineering poses a potential 
threat on the security of anonymous communication systems. To 
counter this threat, there are several research works devoted to 
address this issue. Some of them tried to cover security defects 
by either improving or restricting a specific part of ACS. But 
some of them try to design anonymous channels from scratch. 
One of the appropriate responses to this issue is behind current 
research works on developing a new generation of ACSs [27]. It 
is very important to consider new designs but also the 
improvement of classic ACSs in order to reduce current 
vulnerabilities.  
 The second solution is better because traffic engineering 
aims to work through anonymous channels. So, to address this 
issue, we must focus to change the behavior of the network-
related part of the system. Changing the way how an ACS 
produces network traffic is useful. Also, it is best to construct a 
network traffic pattern which is very similar to other ordinary 
applications like Skype and Bittorent. On the other hand, it 
causes intruders to make a mistake in discerning anonymous 
communications system’s network traffic. 
Making changes in network traffic pattern is very complex. 
It would be regulated by both senders and receivers. In one of 
our research works, we have designed a new anonymous channel 
which is perfect to counter traffic engineering methods [5]. We 
have sampled some ordinary network traffic which belongs to 
specific applications and protocols like Bittorent, Skype, POP3, 
HTTP, SSH, SMTP and etc. A regulator for both sides is 
designed using crypto types [28]. Crypto types are responsible 
for producing a network pattern with time and size related to a 
specific application. These crypto types are shared between 
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sender and receiver and the encrypted flow will be reconstructed 
on the receiver’s side. In each step, random walk helps to choose 
a randomly selected direction which represents any type of 
sampled applications. 
The result of that work shows that when an intruder tries to 
use traffic engineering tricks to discern the type of network flow, 
the sampled sequence of the packets indicates that it does belong 
to an ordinary applications like Skype. So, the intruder will give 
up and follow another sequence. We will be surprised when the 
second network traffic which is produced in the next session 
flows through the network. If the intruder sampled a set of 
packets from the previous flow, the new one will not be matched 
with the previous network traffic. It is because in each step, 
random walk changes the traffic pattern. If the size of produced 
pattern is very high, the probability of detecting a similar pattern 
in even 1000 times repetition of sampling is inconsiderable. 
 
𝑃𝑠=0(𝑤) = ∏[
1
(2 × 𝑑) − 𝑙
]
𝑚
𝑖=1
             (2) 
 
It is possible to calculate the probability of discerning the 
entire walk which is constructed of m points that should be 
correctly matched. Equation 2 indicates this, where m is the 
number of walks that is processed and d is the same dimension. 
In self-avoiding random walk, probability is measured in a 
different way. This means that some directions should be easily 
removed from the set of adjacent nodes. The equation shows the 
probability of determining match points with self-avoiding 
random walk where l is the set of visited nodes. The intruder 
does not understand the policies which are executed and this 
constraint should be considered as a game changer parameter. 
We called this technique Multimodality Injection. In equation 2, 
s represents the start point of the walker which is set zero by 
default.  
The other type of solutions is about designing a new ACS. 
Even though Tor is very popular, it is not the only origin of ACS 
researches. Mixnet is one of the ACSs which focuses on traffic 
analysis and recently is used to develop new research to prevent 
selective DoS attacks [29]. Also, it has the ability to incorporate 
with Lattice based cryptography system to ensure privacy of 
location in mobile systems [31]. As the other ACS, we can refer 
to ALERT [11], Anonymizer [11], Crowds [11], Herd [27], and 
PACOM [11]. 
IV. ANALYSIS, COMPARISON, AND EVALUATION 
As mentioned in the earlier sections, we showed pros and 
cons of anonymous communications systems according to 
current trends especially those related to traffic engineering 
approaches. In this section, we aim to analyze the mentioned 
threats and solutions to make it clear whether an ACS could be 
fully secured against traffic engineering attacks or not. 
A. Security Analysis and Comparison 
The fact that anonymity applications are susceptible to 
traffic-engineering attacks is clear enough to consider it as a 
potential threat. Based on the performed method, the danger 
level may be variant and depends on sampled data. We divide 
the possible situations into two categories. The first includes 
some traffic engineering methods that aim to detect encrypted 
network flows. The second is about detecting behavior of the 
application without considering its encrypted contents. As we 
mentioned earlier, an example for the first approach is Hidden 
Markov Model [15]. The second manner is very general and 
seems independent from anonymity-specific attributes like 
hidden location and encrypted contents. This type of traffic 
engineering methods would be used in all network flow samples. 
They mostly depend on the behavior of applications. Two of the 
recent approaches are session level flow classification [16] and 
detection of unidentified network flows [24]. As shown in Table 
1, some of recent approaches in traffic engineering are compared 
using variety of parameters. 
 
Table 1- Categorization of traffic engineering techniques by types and features. 
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Unidentified Network 
Flow Detection [24] 
95%  behavioral x4 Yes 
Session Level [16] 99% behavioral ex Yes 
Co-clustering [30] 93% behavioral ex Yes 
HMM [15] 80% content-based ex Yes 
EPM [32] 90% content-based nx No 
Distance based [30] 80% behavioral x4 Yes 
 
According to the Table 1, traffic-engineering methods that 
can be used to identify anonymous communication systems are 
categorized by the type of techniques. The accuracy of detection 
in behavioral methods is naturally higher than content-based 
methods. Implementations of behavioral systems have higher 
complexity and usually perform in cooperation with online 
monitoring tools. But content-based approaches are good to 
identify types of cryptographic methods used in that ACS. The 
traffic sampling in the both of them is identical except for 
situations when we need to analyze sampled data in offline 
mode. Typically, content-based methods are appropriate for 
analyzing the behavior of subsystems like security methods, type 
of transmitted data, communication protocols, and anomaly 
detection. 
Behavioral traffic-engineering methods map current network 
level attributes to logical and behavioral parameters. It means 
that it is not important for them to know what type of contents 
are transmitted via the network. They only make use of three 
significant parameters including time, size, and direction. As 
shown in Figure 2, a visual comparison of mentioned approaches 
in traffic engineering of ACS is presented. It is obvious that 
HMM, as one of the best content-based methods, is less accurate 
than behavioral methods in true detection of an ACS application. 
So, when it comes to anonymity applications, it is better to 
consider behavioral traffic engineering methods as potential 
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threats since the use of strong cryptography methods makes an 
ACS impenetrable against content-based attacks. In the picture, 
each node represents level of accuracy. At least we can state that 
the possibility of such a successful analytical attack against ACS 
is expected to be low. 
 
 
Fig. 2. A visual comparison of the mentioned methods. 
B. Evaluation of Solution 
As mentioned, our investigations show that the main target 
for any defense strategy in anonymous communication systems 
should be the behavioral methods. They pose a potential threat 
to anonymity applications. So, the possible solution is a new 
structure that makes the ACS strong against behavioral attacks. 
Our recent research presents a solution to this issue [5]. In that 
work, a new anonymous channel based on randomization 
features is offered. It constructs a custom network pattern using 
random walk. It is very useful to overcome threats reflected by 
behavioral traffic analysis approaches. 
In each generation of RAPS (Random-walk based 
Anonymous Pattern Simulator), the system produces a new type 
of pattern based on its pre-organized database. The database is a 
composition of the most popular applications’ sampled data. 
Based on random steps, the simulator injects a random 
application’s feature to the same generated network flow. When 
the intruder gets its own sample, in each time, he faces an 
ordinary type of behaviors. The behavior of applications and 
protocols like Skype, Bittorent, POP3, HTTP, SSH, Emule etc. 
is used in the same work to unleash a wrong signal to the 
intruders. 
As long as the variety of sampled applications is enhanced, 
the immunity against behavioral analysis of traffics is decreased 
respectively. This work is not the only research dedicated to 
traffic engineering methods in ACS, but it is one of the creative 
approaches which concerns analytical attacks. It gives a good 
view on the ACS issues against traffic engineering methods. 
C. Limitations of Proposal 
This work is conducted using analysis of the current issues 
in anonymous communication systems according to traffic 
engineering methods. We have presented some solutions to 
overcome the mentioned issues. But the solutions are not limited 
to those stated in this study. We extracted the result of traffic 
engineering methods from various research works and they have 
been experimented on using different samples. So, real 
implementation of these analytical methods may help to receive 
more precise results. Also, execution on a unique data set 
definitely gives competitive results. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this work, we aimed to present a realistic view on current 
issues of anonymous communication systems where traffic 
analysis matters. We investigated current challenges and traffic 
engineering methods that endanger the anonymity and privacy 
of such applications. We divided traffic analysis methods into 
two categories including content-based and behavioral. 
Technical features of these methods were stated using 
quantitative parameters. The study shows that the main concern 
to improve ACS against traffic analysis attacks should be 
focused on behavioral methods. This means that we must 
propose a solution to change the behavior of an anonymity 
application via the Internet. A solution is studied to address a 
new defense strategy against traffic engineering attacks. Our 
investigations indicate that when it comes to anonymous 
communication systems, the behavioral methods are stronger 
than content-based approaches. 
Many researchers work on finding and improving 
vulnerabilities of popular applications such as Tor. But at the 
same time, new anonymity tools and public applications are 
emerging which we mentioned in this study. One of the future 
works is to start a study to analyze other anonymity applications 
against traffic engineering methods. Another future work is to 
propose solutions against emerging behavioral methods that aim 
to reveal ACS applications through the Internet. Each attack 
needs its corresponding counterattack reaction. Experimenting 
with all behavioral traffic-engineering methods on the same data 
set, is considered as another future research work. This would 
make the power of each method comparable in the same setting. 
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